

Insider Threat Protection

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a unique approach to business challenges



International consulting firm in cybersecurity & IS performance



Our missions

- Control cyber risks
- Identify, protect, detect, respond and recover
- Imagine, build and operate efficient and secure information systems



An answer to our clients' challenges

 EvaBssi combines methodological know-how, high level of technical expertise and Research & Development



2007Company creation2021Acquisition by Sopra Steria



8
Offices on 4 continents



+200Active clients



34 M€Turnover 2021



25%Average yearly growth



280 Average employees' age: 33 years old



AIRBUS

Leading multinational **aerospace** company

"At Airbus, we believe Al is a key competitive advantage that enables us to capitalise on the value of our data."



Design



Manufacturing



Mobility



Cybersecurity



Defence



863 commercial aircrafts and **332** helicopters delivered in 2019





Insider Threat

The potential for an **individual** who has/had **authorized** access to an organization's assets to use their access in order to **harm** that organization



Unintentional Insider

negligence, accident



Malicious Insider

retaliation, personal gain



External Actor

collusion with an Insider, credentials theft





\$11.45M

average cost per incident

in 2020, with 63% of insider threats resulting from employee negligence

-Ponemon Institute Cost of Insider Threats 2020-

207 days

to identify a data breach on average

and 73 days to contain a data breach, in 2020

> -IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2020

44%

rise of insider threats incidents

over the past 2 years, with average cost per incident up to \$15.38M

> -Proofpoint Cost of Insider Threats Global Report 2022-





Insider Protection: Setting



Project launched in 2019



Aim at detecting **potential** Insider Threats

User-centered



Behavioral analysis




End product: Key Trust Indicator








Insider Protection: Challenges





Case-by-case approach







Anomaly case examples


Example: Download/Access substantial amount of data

- Sensor 1: abnormal downloads from Source 1
- Sensor 2: abnormal accesses from Source 1
- Sensor 3: abnormal accesses from Source 2
















Sensor: general overview

Given a part of its AC's scope, outputs a score for each user Multisource input Multiple scopes Global Hourly Community Daily Individual Weekly





Sensor: global score



Each point represents a **daily** value for one of the users


The **darker** the colour, the **higher** the anomalous score

File Count

AIRBUS



Sensor: community score




Community based score for a user (on a given day):

Average of the distances to every user of his community.





Sensor: individual score



Each point represents a daily value for one of the users

The darker the colour, the higher the anomalous score



Sensor: combination & aggregation

Combinations of **contextual** and **temporal** scopes yields behavioral diversity, **ex**: weekly IBA

A single sensor can have several scores **ex:** GBA, IBA, weekly IBA

Scores capture different **patterns**, hence do not distribute the same

Density estimation from observed data

Before the aggregation:

Each score observation is transformed into the probability of having a score smaller than the observation





Sensor

Technology:



Mix of **Machine Learning** and
statistical tools

Objective: create an operational baseline before complexifying the solutions





Joint effort by Cyber Eng. and Data Sci. to analyse the sensor's behavior

Use of Internal
Evaluation of
Unsupervised Outlier
Detection (IREOS)







Key Trust Indicator: aggregation

KTI is computed as a weighted sum of Anomaly Case scores



KTI

- Inverted and scaled between 0 and 100
- The closest to 100, the less suspicious

AC weight: measured by cyber experts using internal criticality indicators, and external indicators (MITRE etc...)







Key Trust Indicator: Value

Visualisation:



Visualisation of the KTI, including the contributions of the differents ACs and their sensors

Enhance investigation power for SOC/CERT

Analysis:



KTI values and variations along time can be analysed to determine if an account is compromised

Enable **identification** of potential **Insider Threats**





Insider Protection Usage

Al is **not** a **decision-maker** here: its goal is to **reinforce** human expertise, not supersede it

Users ending up on the SOC's radar can be suspended or revoked

Evasion & Poisoning

Need to blend in or blur the outliers

Distributed design and scores' diversity makes it hard

Tedious information gathering

Model stealing & Inference

Need to probe the models

High risk of popping up on SOC radar





Ethics and Legal Context



Data pseudonymisation

 No connection between the user and the private individual, only between the user and the data

Compartmentalisation of the project

- Only authorised personnel (SOC analysts) can link a user to its private individuals
- Penetration test audit

Legal Team implication from the start

- Objective: ensure Insider Protection complies with the GDPR
- Dictates which data can be used or not by Insider Protection
- · Each Anomaly Case needs to be approved before any development

Airbus European Al Act Task Force

- All-round multidisciplinary team composed of technical and legal experts from all across Airbus
- Objective: define the impact of future regulations on the group and anticipate the compliance of Airbus projects









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